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RECONCILING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS:
EUGENIC ABORTION AND HOME BIRTH
DISPUTES AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
OLIVIA CORAL DANIELS†
ABSTRACT
Reproductive autonomy has been at the heart of culture clashes
across the world for decades. Judicial intervention has proven
necessary to resolve the rights and interests clashes between pregnant
women, medical care providers, and fetuses. At the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”), judges have carefully parsed Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights to balance the various
rights implicated, including the right to abortion, the right to agency in
giving birth, and the right to conscientious objection. Further, decisionmakers may take into account state interests in fetal life. As the ECtHR
prepares to face the next stages of litigation concerning reproductive
rights—eugenic abortions and home births—its decisions will set an
example for the rest of the world, as many governments face and
prepare to tackle similar questions and rights clashes. This Note turns
to international human rights law to derive three legal principles that
should guide the ECtHR in its upcoming decisions. Applying this
original framework, this Note argues, the ECtHR can effectively
balance the rights of pregnant women, the rights of medical care
providers, and the interests of fetuses. In doing so, the European
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human rights system will ensure women retain legal agency when it
comes to decisions about whether and where to give birth.

INTRODUCTION
To some, her candor was unsettling. Had she known her fetus
carried a Down syndrome diagnosis, the unnamed Latvian woman
argued, she would have exercised her legal right to an abortion.1 Before
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “the Strasbourg
Court”), the anonymous applicant alleged physicians had therefore
violated her human rights by failing to provide her with antenatal
screening tests.2 In her view, her right to an abortion under Latvian law
should not be restricted simply because her fetus had been diagnosed
with a genetic disease.3 Yet, over the past year, at least one European
country has proposed a complete ban on “eugenic abortions,”4 an
evolving term describing elective abortions on the basis of fetal
disability or abnormality.5
But agency in reproductive decision-making expands beyond the
choice of whether to give birth to also encompass where to give birth.
In 2014, Sânziana Ioni -Ciurez wished to birth her second child at her

1. A.K. v. Latvia, App. No. 33011/08, ¶ 30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-145005 [https://perma.cc/8KMQ-SN3S].
2. Id. ¶¶ 66–67.
3. See id. ¶ 30 (“[H]ad [the applicant] known that the child had a congenital disease, she
would have chosen to undergo an abortion on medical grounds.”).
4. Poland has banned such abortions, sparking mass protests across the country. Poland
Enforces Controversial Near-Total Abortion Ban, BBC (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-55838210 [https://perma.cc/6RQA-U7XV].
5. This terminology has been in use since the late twentieth century, during which pro-life
activists in the United States argued that permitting eugenic abortions “exposed the larger
damage legalization [of abortion] would do to society—the denigration of all vulnerable and
disabled persons before and after birth.” Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017
UTAH L. REV. 587, 591. Recently, it has enjoyed significant use by conservative civil society
groups in Europe. See, e.g., Grégor Puppinck, Abortion and Eugenics Before the European Court
of Human Rights, CTR. FOR FAM. & HUM. RTS. (Apr. 4, 2012), https://c-fam.org/turtle_bay/
abortion-and-eugenics-before-the-european-court-of-human-rights [https://perma.cc/9AXN-UTCX]
(arguing that the ECtHR should condemn eugenic abortions); Nicolas Bauer, Towards a Ban on
Eugenic Abortion in Hungary?, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST. (Feb. 2021), https://eclj.org/eugenics/
un/vers-une-interdiction-de-lavortement-eugenique-en-hongrie-- [https://perma.cc/9GKK-JEX9]
(advocating for Hungary to find eugenic abortions unconstitutional in 2021). This Note adopts an
inclusive interpretation of “eugenic abortions,” which covers both immediately fatal and nonfatal
disabilities and fetal impairments. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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home alongside a supervising midwife or obstetrician.6 Despite her
“low risk pregnancy with no complications,” Romanian law made it
impossible for Ioni -Ciurez to find a medical professional willing to
supervise her home birth.7 During the birth, which was “forced” to
occur at a public hospital, Ioni -Ciurez alleged “during labour she was
separated from her husband, kept immobilised in a wheelchair for
about an hour after arriving at the hospital, and had three consecutive
[and unnecessary] pelvic examinations by three different individuals.”8
Ioni -Ciurez’s physical and emotional trauma is far from unusual when
it comes to sexual and reproductive healthcare experiences across
Eastern Europe.9
Both issues—eugenic abortions and home births—are
incorporated by the human right to reproductive health.10 The two
issues are intrinsically linked by the scope of reproductive autonomy.
Pregnant individuals11 are not only obstructed in deciding whether to
give birth; they also experience intense regulatory challenges in
electing the circumstances surrounding birth.12 The ECtHR has

6. Ioni -Ciurez v. Romania, App. No. 42594/14 (Mar. 7, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-172633 [https://perma.cc/FF5F-S7JS].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
10. The right to sexual and reproductive health is derived from the right to health. See U.N.,
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 22 (2016)
on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (2016) (“Health facilities,
goods, information and services related to sexual and reproductive health care should be
accessible to all individuals and groups without discrimination and free from barriers.”).
11. Pregnancies, abortions, and childbirth affect more than those who self-identify as
cisgender women and use feminine pronouns. Reproductive justice advocates are currently
developing inclusive language and policies that acknowledge the reproductive health, rights, and
justice of different and often intersecting gender, racial, and cultural identities. Sophia Serrao, We
Must Promote Gender-Inclusive Reproductive Health Care, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS.
(July 2, 2020), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-impact/blog/general/we-must-promotegender-inclusive-reproductive-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/WG2Y-AW9A]. To engage directly
with existing jurisprudence on reproductive rights, this Note uses the terms “pregnant women”
and “pregnant individuals” interchangeably, but it acknowledges the important distinctions
between the two, particularly when it comes to reproductive justice issues beyond the scope of
this Note.
12. See Daniela Drandi & Bashi Hazard, EU Governments Must Give Women Access to
Midwifery Care For Home Births, EURO NEWS (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.euronews.com/2021/
03/10/eu-governments-must-give-women-access-to-midwifery-care-for-home-births [https://perma.cc/
JAX7-2C3V] (describing regulatory impediments to home births across Eastern Europe); Kathi
Valeii, People Who Want Home Births Have To Jump Through All Kinds of Hoops, VICE (Aug.
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demonstrated its willingness over the past two decades to engage
directly with the competing rights and interests implicated by
reproductive health decisions.13 Such decisions often trigger difficult
rights conflicts as well as moral and ethical questions. For example,
does a pregnant woman’s right to an abortion or choice to give birth at
home instead of in a hospital infringe upon a fetus’s rights to life and
health? Is a fetus even a holder of rights in the first instance? If so, who
should exercise these rights on the fetus’s behalf? Relatedly, does a
physician have a right to conscientiously object to performing an
abortion or supervising a home birth? If so, does the exercise of this
right infringe upon a pregnant woman’s reproductive freedom?
This Note proposes a novel analytic framework for the ECtHR to
adopt when resolving conflicts in reproductive health cases that
implicate the competing rights and interests of pregnant women,
fetuses, and medical care providers.14 This approach is based upon
insights extracted from case law and scholarship on a cluster of issues
that have not previously been examined together—eugenic abortion,15
8, 2018, 6:40 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/pawxyz/home-birth-midwife-restrictions
[https://perma.cc/GTW2-82KC] (describing a similar situation in the United States, where “some
states’ midwifery regulations end up limiting birth options for families”).
13. This is in contrast to the United States, where the Supreme Court has been noncommittal
on the future of reproductive rights. See, e.g., Ruth Dawson, Megan K. Donovan, Adam Sonfield
& Lauren Cross, An Even-More-Conservative U.S. Supreme Court Could Be Devastating for
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://
www.guttmacher.org/article/2020/09/even-more-conservative-us-supreme-court-could-be-devast
ating-sexual-and-reproductive [https://perma.cc/JP4K-77CS] (warning that the new makeup of
the U.S. Supreme Court “threatens reproductive rights, LGBTQ+ rights and health care rights
broadly”).
14. Existing scholarship has thus far primarily addressed the Strasbourg Court’s abortion
and home birth jurisprudence as separate matters. See generally, e.g., Federico Fabbrini, The
European Court of Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the Right to
Abortion: Roe v. Wade on the Other Side of the Atlantic, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2011)
(chronicling the ECtHR’s earlier abortion jurisprudence); Caitlin McCartney, “Childbirth
Rights”? Legal Uncertainties Under the European Convention After Ternovszky v. Hungary, 40
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 543 (2015) (examining the apparent conflict in the ECtHR’s home
birth jurisprudence); Julia Kapela ska-Pr gowska, The Scales of the European Court of Human
Rights: Abortion Restriction in Poland, the European Consensus, and the State’s Margin of
Appreciation, 23 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 213 (2021) (advising the ECtHR to revisit its
reproductive rights through the lens of abortion only).
15. Eugenic abortion in the ECtHR context has only recently begun to receive attention
from scholars. See generally Bríd Ní Ghráinne & Aisling McMahon, Access to Abortion in Cases
of Fatal Foetal Abnormality: A New Direction for the European Court of Human Rights?, 19 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 561 (2020) (arguing that the ECtHR will soon align itself with the U.N. Human
Rights Committee to find that a prohibition of abortion in the case of fatal fetal abnormality
constitutes torture under the European Convention of Human Rights).
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home birth, conscientious objection, and other human rights
principles.16 It applies this framework to abortions17 and home births,
two areas where the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence has thus far
failed to converge, revealing the relevance of this inquiry across
different types of reproductive choices—from deciding whether to give
birth at all to exercising control over how and where to give birth. This
Note focuses on how the ECtHR should resolve these conflicts. Yet it
also identifies the larger implications of its proposed framework, as the
rights in the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) are
similarly protected in other global and regional human rights
instruments and in most national constitutions, including in the United
States.18
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the
European human rights system, discussing the right to respect for
private and family life protected by Article 8 of the ECHR—the central
provision in the ECtHR’s reproductive rights jurisprudence—and
relevant accompanying legal doctrines. This Part subsequently
provides a brief overview of the international human rights law
landscape and its relevance to the ECtHR. Part II turns to
international human rights law more broadly. Drawing from various
sources, including the ECHR, ECtHR case law, U.N. human rights
treaties, U.N. treaty body case law, and existing scholarship, this Part
derives three original, core principles of reproductive rights: the right
to reproductive freedom; the right to conscientious objection; and state
16. For a discussion of how some of these legal issues have masked the voices of women in
reproductive-rights standard-setting, see generally Liiri Oja & Alicia Ely Yamin, “Woman” in the
European Human Rights System: How Is the Reproductive Rights Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights Constructing Narratives of Women’s Citizenship?, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 62 (2016).
17. The scope of this Note’s discussion of abortions is limited to elective, or therapeutic,
abortions within the first trimester of pregnancy, as permitting such abortions is “[t]he standard
practice across Europe.” European Abortion Law: A Comparative Overview, CTR. FOR REPROD.
RTS. (Mar. 3, 2021), https://reproductiverights.org/european-abortion-law-comparative-overview
-0 [https://perma.cc/FD93-MCCS].
18. Notably, the Sixth Circuit has upheld eugenic abortion restrictions as constitutional. See
Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512, 550 (6th Cir. 2021) (“The people of Ohio were
entitled to enact into law their considered judgment that those with Down syndrome are worth
protecting.”). The U.S. Supreme Court is currently poised to make difficult decisions about the
scope of abortion rights; already, Justice Clarence Thomas has termed abortion generally as “an
act rife with potential for eugenic manipulation” and identified eugenic abortion to be a global
problem. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring); see id. at 1790–91 (identifying the rates of abortions due to fetal disabilities in
Iceland, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, and Asia).
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representation of fetal interests, not rights. Part III applies these
principles to the European human rights system in the context of
nascent eugenic abortion and home birth issues. Ultimately, this Part
demonstrates the utility of Part II’s principles and offers the ECtHR a
template of elements to consider when it confronts future conflicts over
rights and interests in the reproductive health space. This Note
concludes by considering the global implications of implementing the
proposed framework.
I. BACKGROUND: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
In Europe, there are three relevant levels of human rights law:
domestic, regional, and international. This Part introduces the latter
two categories19 and explores their intersection. First, it discusses the
European human rights system and its institutions, instruments, and
core guarantees. Then, it turns to international human rights law,
introducing the United Nations and its core human rights treaties and
treaty bodies, before demonstrating how international human rights
law informs jurisprudence at the regional level.
A. Regional Human Rights Law: The European System
As the regional judicial body established by the ECHR,20 the
ECtHR is a court within the Council of Europe. Founded in 1949, the
Council of Europe is distinct from and larger than the European
Union.21 All forty-seven Council of Europe member states are parties
to the ECHR and thus subject to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction.22 Once a
complaint, which may be submitted by an individual or another
19. As this Note is not focused on any particular state within Europe, rather the Council of
Europe states generally, domestic human rights jurisprudence is only relevant insofar as it
conflicts with either regional or international human rights law.
20. European Convention on Human Rights art. 19, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S.
No. 005.
21. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, E.T.S. No. 001 (establishing the
Council of Europe following the Second World War).
22. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 005, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Oct. 30, 2021),
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=He
e1pMgM [https://perma.cc/J85F-VYRV]. After exhausting domestic remedies, individuals may
bring claims to the ECtHR alleging violations of one or more of the rights protected by the
ECHR. European Convention on Human Rights arts. 32–35, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005. The
ECtHR also permits third parties to intervene in cases by submitting written comments and
participating in hearings. Id. art. 36.
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member state, passes the Strasbourg Court’s preliminary review of its
admissibility, it is communicated to the respondent state, which has a
chance to submit a response on the claim’s admissibility and merits,
before either a settlement or hearing.23 Each individual complaint is
communicated and judged on its merits by an ECtHR committee of
three judges in the event the complaint is “already covered by wellestablished case-law of the Court.”24 Complaints not already covered
by existing ECtHR case law are heard by a chamber of seven judges.25
In exceptional circumstances, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber, which is
composed of seventeen judges, issues judgments on the merits of
complaints; such cases must have either received a final chamber
judgment and been “referred” for review to the Grand Chamber or
have been “relinquished” to the Grand Chamber at the lower level
because the complaint “raises a serious question affecting the
interpretation of the [ECHR] or if there is a risk of inconsistency with
a previous judgment of the Court.”26
The ECHR itself protects many foundational rights guarantees,27
but the rights enshrined in Article 8 are of particular relevance to this
Note. Article 8(1) guarantees that “[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”28 The
ECtHR has interpreted this provision as protecting, for example, gay
rights,29 domestic violence victims,30 and reproductive rights.31

23. Information to Applicants: Procedure Following Communication of an Application NonContentious Phase, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS. (July 30, 2020), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Applicants_communication_non_contentious_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8CT-R4F5].
24. EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS, THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 4 (2021), https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/U442-UDCZ].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4–5.
27. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005
(protecting the right to life); id. art. 2 (protecting the right to a fair trial).
28. Id. art. 8(1).
29. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, ¶ 41 (Oct. 22, 1981), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57473 [https://perma.cc/Y5T9-HVYZ] (finding that the United
Kingdom’s domestic legislation criminalizing homosexual acts between consenting adults
“constitutes a continuing interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life
(which includes his sexual life) within the meaning of Article 8”).
30. See, e.g., Bevacqua & S. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, ¶ 84 (June 12, 2008), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-86875 [https://perma.cc/UT4S-UPUR] (noting the state’s failure to
adopt sufficient legal protections for domestic violence victims violated its obligations under
Article 8).
31. See discussion infra Parts II.A–B.
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Importantly, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 8 as creating both
negative and positive obligations.32 States have positive obligations to
take affirmative measures to ensure individuals’ rights are fully
realized and not infringed upon by private actors.33 To determine
whether a state has met its positive obligations, the Strasbourg Court
asks whether a “fair balance [has been] struck between the competing
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole.”34 For
example, the Strasbourg Court found Croatia in violation of Article 8
when it lacked a procedure to compel a suspected father to comply with
court-ordered DNA testing; there, the domestic law failed to “strike a
fair balance between the right of the applicant to have her uncertainty
as to her personal identity eliminated without unnecessary delay and
that of her supposed father not to undergo DNA tests.”35
On the other hand, states have negative obligations not to
arbitrarily interfere—for example, through their domestic laws,
regulators, or courts—with individuals’ private and family lives.36 Once
an applicant demonstrates the state has interfered with any rights listed
in Article 8(1),37 the ECtHR will determine the interference is
permitted only where it pursues a “legitimate aim” identified in Article
8(2)38 and is “necessary in a democratic society.”39 When assessing the

32. EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ¶¶ 4–13 (2020), https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KW96-4UNG].
33. See, e.g., Oliari & Others v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11, 36030/1, ¶ 185 (July 21, 2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156265 [https://perma.cc/9NVH-QKXY] (finding Italy, which
legalized neither same-sex marriage nor alternative legal recognition of same-sex partnerships,
“failed to fulfil their positive obligation to ensure that the applicants have available a specific legal
framework providing for the recognition and protection of their same-sex unions”).
34. Powell & Rayner v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9310/81, ¶ 41 (Feb. 21, 1990), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57622 [https://perma.cc/3WLH-S5FU].
35. Mikuli v. Croatia, App. No. 53176/99, ¶¶ 64–66 (Feb. 7, 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-60035 [https://perma.cc/T5AT-Y5DN].
36. See, e.g., Libert v. France, App. No. 588/13, ¶ 41 (Feb. 22, 2018), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-181273 [https://perma.cc/EX5L-8AX6] (“Since the interference
was by a public authority, the complaint must be analysed from the angle not of the State’s
positive obligations, . . . but of its negative obligations.”).
37. European Convention on Human Rights art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005.
38. The second paragraph of Article 8 permits interferences sanctioned by law and
“necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Id. art. 8(2).
39. Dubská & Krejzová v. Czech Republic, App. Nos. 28859/11, 28473/12, ¶¶ 84–101 (Dec.
11, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148632 [https://perma.cc/6X8X-Q5JZ].
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necessity prong of this inquiry, the ECtHR asks both “whether there
existed a pressing social need for the interference” and “whether [the
interference] was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”40
In its necessity analysis, the ECtHR relies heavily on the margin
of appreciation doctrine.41 The margin of appreciation doctrine
acknowledges that domestic legislators and judiciaries may be best
situated to effectively balance ECHR rights and societal interests at the
state level.42 According to the ECtHR, “The scope of the margin of
appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject
matter and its background . . . . ”43 A wide or broad margin means
states have ample room to regulate. Even though it is still possible to
run afoul of the ECHR in this context, the ECtHR is less likely to find
a state has done so.44 Conversely, a narrow margin means the ECtHR
applies a more stringent level of scrutiny.45 The Strasbourg Court
expressly identifies the margin of appreciation as going “hand in hand
with a European supervision.”46 A lack of European consensus among
member states on an issue usually results in a wider margin; an existing

40. Id. ¶ 87.
41. See A, B & C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, ¶ 231 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102332 [https://perma.cc/Q999-NGJ6] (“The Court considers that
the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the State is crucial to its conclusion
as to whether the [interference] struck that fair balance.”).
42. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, ¶ 50 (Dec. 7, 1976), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57499 [https://perma.cc/46ZK-QZH6] (“[I]t is in no way the
Court’s task to take the place of the competent national courts but rather to review . . . the
decisions they delivered in the exercise of their power of appreciation.”); see also BERNADETTE
RAINEY, ELIZABETH WICKS & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 80 (6th ed. 2014) (explaining that the margin of appreciation doctrine encompasses the
space in which states may regulate according to their own policy preferences, and potentially
interfere with rights guarantees, without violating the ECHR).
43. Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04, ¶ 98 (June 24, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-99605 [https://perma.cc/3UDY-HE5D].
44. RAINEY ET AL., supra note 42, at 80–81.
45. See Janneke Gerards, Margin of Appreciation and Incrementalism in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 495, 499 (2018) (“[W]hen the Court
accords a narrow margin of appreciation, it requires that a justification for a restriction be
convincingly established and it strictly assesses the quality and persuasiveness of the justification
advanced by the government.”).
46. Handyside, App. No. 5493/72, ¶ 49; see also id. (“Such supervision concerns both the aim
of the measure challenged and its ‘necessity’; it covers not only the basic legislation but also the
decision applying it, even one given by an independent court.”).
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or emerging European consensus weighs in favor of a narrower
margin.47
Overall, the ECtHR applies a particularly broad margin to states’
regulations around moral and ethical questions, particularly when it
comes to Article 8 matters.48 In these cases, Professor Clare Ryan
argues that the ECtHR has shown a tendency “to grant special
deference to a subset of cases that it deems ‘sensitive.’”49 The
remainder of this Note engages with how the ECtHR and human rights
law generally have conceptualized reproductive freedoms and the
rights and interests conflicts inherent in their resolution. It then
proposes a set of principles for the ECtHR to use moving forward and
applies this framework to two cutting edge issues of reproductive
freedom: eugenic abortions and home births.
B. International Human Rights Law: The U.N. System
European states are not only bound by Council of Europe human
rights instruments and bodies; they are also bound by any U.N. human
rights treaties that they have ratified in their capacities as sovereign
states.50 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights identifies the nine core international human rights
instruments as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
47. See Shai Dothan, Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus To Emerge, 18 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 393, 397 (2018) (“The emerging consensus doctrine is used by the ECHR to discover the
minimal human rights standards that are respected by at least a majority of the countries in
Europe. This minimal standard is then required from all European countries.”).
48. See Clare Ryan, Europe’s Moral Margin: Parental Aspirations and the European Court
of Human Rights, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNT’L L. 467, 473 (2018) (“[T]he Court’s references to
‘sensitive moral and ethical’ issues have increased and migrated almost exclusively to cases
implicating private life and family life.”).
49. Id.
50. In other words, the U.N. treaties bind states, not international organizations like the
Council of Europe or supranational bodies like the European Union. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining a “treaty” as “an
international agreement concluded between States” (emphasis added)).
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Disappearance, the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (“CRPD”).51
States that are parties to these treaties are bound by their text
under international law.52 Further, each of the nine core U.N. human
rights treaties has a treaty monitoring body, composed of independent
experts.53 Treaty monitoring bodies offer authoritative, but not legally
binding, written interpretations of their associated treaties.54 These
bodies may also hear complaints brought by individuals against states,
issue nonbinding opinions on these complaints, assess states’
compliance with their obligations under a given treaty, and initiate
investigations into states’ practices.55 Despite the limitations of treaty
monitoring bodies—their substantive decisions lack legal effect under
international law—Professor Nigel Rodley maintains these bodies
have the potential to, and often do, “contribute to community
expectations of appropriate state behaviour under human rights treaty
obligations,” much like nonbinding U.N. General Assembly
resolutions.56
As a result, treaty monitoring bodies shape human rights law
across the world.57 Scholar Kerstin Mechlem argues that the bodies’
interpretations of treaties “extend[] beyond the parties to a treaty,
promoting the general understanding of a particular right at the

51. The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, OFF. OF
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/
coreinstruments.aspx [https://perma.cc/4TUK-LNQZ].
52. This legal binding is subject to the existence of “reservations”—when permitted by the
treaty—by ratifying states. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 50 (defining
“reservation” as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or
to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”).
53. Human Rights Treaty Bodies, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx [https://perma.cc/QR4L-HZVG].
54. Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH
COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/WhatTBDo.aspx [https://
perma.cc/9734-QE29].
55. Id.
56. Nigel S. Rodley, The Role and Impact of Treaty Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 621, 640 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).
57. See Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNT’L L. 905, 908 (2009) (explaining that treaty monitoring bodies “play an important role
in establishing the normative content of human rights and in giving concrete meaning to individual
rights and state obligations”).
THE
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national and international level by states, [nongovernmental
organizations], academia, and others.”58 The ECtHR, in particular,
looks to the treaty monitoring bodies for interpretive guidance, as
many rights are enshrined in both the ECHR and the U.N. treaties.59
Thus, the relevance of U.N. human rights jurisprudence cannot be
understated on both the international and regional human rights law
planes. The remainder of this Note focuses on how the ECtHR should
continue its practice of drawing from both European and international
sources of international human rights law to shape its jurisprudence
relating to reproductive autonomy.
II. HEALTH AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Throughout the reproductive health litigation space, different
groups of stakeholders interact with one another, often resulting in
interests and rights conflicts. This Note focuses on the three most
directly involved: pregnant women, fetuses, and medical care
providers. Applying original methods by drawing from varied sources
of international human rights law, including U.N. treaties, U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies, regional human rights treaties, and international
and regional human rights case law, this Part derives three principles
to characterize international human rights in the reproductive health
context: the right to reproductive freedom, the right to conscientious
objection, and the existence of fetal interests. Because these principles
emanate from multiple human rights systems, they are not framed as
specific guarantees tied to any particular treaty or legal instrument.
Rather, the principles constitute doctrinal tools for adjudicating and
accommodating conflicts of rights and interests that arise in
reproductive health litigation.

58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Mocanu & Others v. Romania, App. Nos. 10865/09, 45886/07, 32431/08, § II.A.1
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146540 [https://perma.cc/4YR2-UZ3K]
(considering commentary issued by the Committee Against Torture as authoritative when
considering a claim under Article 6 of the ECHR); see also Rodley, supra note 56, at 641
(explaining that the ECtHR “frequently invoke[s]” jurisprudence from the Human Rights
Committee “with approval”).
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A. Principle I: The Right to Reproductive Freedom
None of the nine core U.N. human rights treaties60 expressly
protect the right to reproductive autonomy.61 Still, in advocating for the
right to safe, legal abortions, human rights defenders have invoked
treaty provisions relating to reproductive decisions, including the rights
to privacy, health, equality, life, and freedom from torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.62 As a result,
four U.N. human rights treaties have been interpreted by their
monitoring bodies to apply to the right to reproductive freedom.63 The
CRPD alone expressly guarantees the right to sexual and reproductive
health.64 CEDAW, however, secures the right to nondiscrimination in
accessing health care services, such as “those related to family
planning,” and obliges states to “ensure to women appropriate services
in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal
period.”65 Perhaps most importantly, CEDAW’s Article 16 requires
that women are afforded “rights to decide freely and responsibly on
the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights.”66 Both ICESCR and the ICCPR protect the right to abortion
via the rights to health and to equality, life, privacy, and protection
against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, respectively.67
60. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
61. Lance Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. L. REV. 957, 959
(2010).
62. See Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/women/wrgs/pages/healthrights.aspx [https://perma.cc/
L52E-8EVW] (“Women’s sexual and reproductive health is related to multiple human rights,
including the right to life, the right to be free from torture, the right to health, the right to privacy,
the right to education, and the prohibition of discrimination.”).
63. See id.; infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text.
64. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 25(a), Dec. 6, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3. The specificity in this instrument is largely due to the history of “forced abortion,
contraception or sterilization against [disabled individuals’] will or without their informed
consent.” Stop Regression on Sexual and Reproductive Rights of Women and Girls, UN Experts
Urge, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/
en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23503&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/E78MWGPY].
65. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 12,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 1.
66. Id. art. 16.
67. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2(1), 6, 7, 17, 26, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Although the text of the treaties themselves does not directly
ensure the right to abortion, the treaty monitoring bodies have been
more explicit. In 2018, the CEDAW and CRPD monitoring bodies
jointly called upon states to “decriminalize abortion in all
circumstances and legalize it in a manner that fully respects the
autonomy of women, including women with disabilities.”68 Earlier, in
2016, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
confirmed ICESCR’s Article 12 right to health encompasses sexual and
reproductive health, and it characterized restrictive abortion laws as
“undermin[ing] autonomy and right to equality and non-discrimination
in the full enjoyment of the right to sexual and reproductive health.”69
Further, the U.N. Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), which
monitors the ICCPR, has identified several barriers to abortion access
in interpreting the right to abortion as implicated by the ICCPR’s
Article 6 right to life; these include, but are not limited to,
conscientious objection by medical care providers, domestic
criminalization of abortion, and insufficient privacy protections for
abortion seekers.70 The HRC recommended that states “not introduce
new barriers and . . . remove existing barriers” to abortion access.71
Decisions of the U.N. treaty monitoring bodies in response to
individual complaints have confirmed the right to reproductive
freedom. The HRC has rendered nonbinding decisions on restrictions
to abortion access in states where abortion is legal under domestic
law.72 The HRC has also considered whether domestic laws prohibiting

68. Comm. on the Rts. of Pers. with Disabilities & Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Guaranteeing Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights for
All Women, in Particular Women with Disabilities, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM.
RTS. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDStatements.aspx
[https://perma.cc/78BJ-2DB6]; see id. (“Access to safe and legal abortion . . . are essential aspects
of women’s reproductive health and a prerequisite for safeguarding their human rights to life,
health, equality before the law and equal protection of the law, non-discrimination, information,
privacy, bodily integrity and freedom from torture and ill treatment.”). This statement was
released as a response to “increasing rollback and regression on respect for international human
rights norms that threaten sexual and reproductive health and rights.” Id.
69. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 10, ¶ 34.
70. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Oct.
30, 2018).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., K.L. v. Peru, Communication No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (Nov. 22, 2005) (finding that a minor seeking a therapeutic
abortion in Peru suffered cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7
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nontherapeutic abortions, such as the law in effect in Ireland until
2018,73 constitute ICCPR violations. In Siobhán Whelan v. Ireland,74
the HRC found Ireland had violated the ICCPR when a woman facing
a nonviable pregnancy was forced to leave the country in order to
obtain a legal abortion.75 This jurisprudence confirms what the HRC
has expressed in its general comment: the right to abortion is not
expressly protected, but it is recognized and given substance by
evolving human rights practices.76
The ECtHR itself has not taken so broad and definitive a stance,
particularly when it comes to abortion. The ECtHR has declined to
find a right to abortion within the ECHR, expressly finding Article 8’s
right to respect for private and family life “cannot be interpreted as
conferring a right to abortion.”77 Nonetheless, the Grand Chamber
previously issued a complicated opinion in the context of the sincerepealed Irish nontherapeutic abortion ban.78 In A, B, & C v. Ireland,79
the ECtHR explained because Irish women had “the right to travel
abroad lawfully for an abortion with access to appropriate information
and medical care in Ireland,” the Irish prohibition on abortion did not
exceed the wide margin of appreciation awarded to states on the issue
violation) due to “mental suffering” when the hospital director refused to provide the
termination).
73. See Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (Act. No. 31) (Ir.),
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/31 [https://perma.cc/7YUV-AU5Q] (legalizing certain
forms of abortion in Ireland). Therapeutic abortions typically refer to those performed to save
the life or health of the pregnant woman or when the woman has become pregnant due to rape
or incest. Nontherapeutic abortions refer to abortions that are not deemed medically necessary
(for example, to save the life or health of the pregnant woman) and are instead elective.
74. Hum. Rts. Comm., Whelan v. Ireland, Communication No. 2425/2014, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/119/D/2425/2014 (Mar. 17, 2017).
75. Id. ¶ 8 (finding breach based on mental suffering, privacy violation, and discrimination
between Whelan and women who chose to carry unviable pregnancies to term).
76. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36, supra note 70, ¶ 8 (“Although States
parties may adopt measures designed to regulate voluntary terminations of pregnancy, such
measures must not result in violation of the right to life of a pregnant woman or girl.”).
77. P. & S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 96 (Oct. 30, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-114098 [https://perma.cc/7TYJ-PHGP].
78. See generally A, B & C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102332 [https://perma.cc/73HS-KN7X] (finding no right to abortion
under the ECHR but nonetheless finding that Ireland had failed to fulfill its Article 8 obligations
when it did not “implement[ a] legislative or regulatory regime providing an accessible and
effective procedure by which the third applicant could have established whether she qualified for
a lawful abortion in Ireland”).
79. A, B & C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-10233 [https://perma.cc/73HS-KN7X].
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of abortion.80 But the ECtHR also determined one of the applicants,
who suffered from a rare cancer and endured increased health risks
due to her pregnancy, was not afforded sufficient procedures through
which to establish that she qualified for a legal therapeutic abortion
under Irish law.81 This constituted an Article 8 violation.82
When it comes to states that legalize nontherapeutic abortions,
however, the ECtHR has developed an access-oriented jurisprudence.
In 2007, in Tysi c v. Poland,83 the ECtHR determined that “[o]nce the
legislature decides to allow abortion, it must not structure its legal
framework in a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it.”84
The ECtHR reiterated this principle in 2012: “[T]he State is under a
positive obligation to create a procedural framework enabling a
pregnant woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful
abortion.”85 In short, where domestic laws permit abortions, the state
must ensure this is a meaningful right by ensuring its accessibility
within its jurisdiction.
But the ECtHR also interprets reproductive freedom beyond
decisions to terminate a pregnancy; in addition to encompassing the
decision not to give birth, reproductive freedom via Article 8 protects
decisions about where to give birth. In Ternovszky v. Hungary,86 the
ECtHR found Hungary’s “ambiguous legislation on home birth,”
which dissuaded health professionals from assisting with home births,
violated the applicant’s Article 8 rights.87 The ECtHR explained, “In
the context of home birth, regarded as a matter of personal choice of
the mother, . . . the mother is entitled to a legal and institutional
environment that enables her choice, except where other rights render
necessary the restriction thereof.”88 As a result, the Strasbourg Court
recognized a “right to choice in . . . child delivery[, which] includes the

80. Id. ¶ 241.
81. Id. ¶¶ 250, 263.
82. Id. ¶ 268
83. Tysi c v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03 (Mar. 20, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00179812 [https://perma.cc/FBE6-DX5H].
84. Id. ¶ 116.
85. P. & S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 99 (Oct. 30, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-114098 [https://perma.cc/7TYJ-PHGP].
86. Ternovszky v. Hungary, App. No. 67545/09 (Dec. 14, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-102254 [https://perma.cc/VD4A-XHS7].
87. Id. ¶¶ 12, 27.
88. Id. ¶ 24.
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legal certainty that the choice is lawful and not subject to sanctions,
directly or indirectly,” independent of the state’s legal treatment of
abortion.89
In sum, the current international human rights landscape confirms
that the right to reproductive freedom encompasses a right to sexual
and reproductive health, the right to access abortion where it is legal,
and the right to choice in where one gives birth.
B. Principle II: The Right to Conscientious Objection
Conscientious objection rights have historically been developed
and recognized in the context of military service.90 More recently,
however, conscientious objection has become a tool used by states,
medical care providers, and conservative civil society groups in their
quest to restrict abortion access.91 The right to conscientious objection
is a civil and political right embedded in the ICCPR’s Article 18.92 But
this provision makes clear that external manifestations of one’s faith or
beliefs is not an absolute guarantee: “Freedom to manifest one’s
religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”93
In advocating for states to ensure abortion access, the HRC made its
position on conscientious objection protections clear: “States

89. Id.
90. See generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Invention of a Human Right: Conscientious
Objection at the United Nations, 1947–2011, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 753 (2013)
(chronicling the development of the right to conscientious objection “as a universal right, good
against all nations” and affirmed by the HRC and ICCPR).
91. See, e.g., Grégor Puppinck, Abortion: Three ECHR Judges Undermine the Right to
Conscientious Objection, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST. (Mar. 2020), https://eclj.org/conscientiousobjection/echr/avortement-trois-juges-de-la-cedhsapent-le-droit-a-lobjection-de-conscience
[https://perma.cc/LX5X-HA6T] (describing medical professionals who are not legally permitted
to opt out of performing certain procedures as having been “sacrificed to the dogma of abortion,”
an act which “puts an end to a human life” and would cause the ECHR drafters to “turn over in
their graves”); Christina Zampas & Ximena Andión-Ibañez, Conscientious Objection to Sexual
and Reproductive Health Services: International Human Rights Standards and European Law and
Practice, 19 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 231, 233 (2012) (“[C]onscientious objection clauses are being
applied too broadly and sometimes even abused . . . result[ing] in serious violations of women’s
right to access quality sexual and reproductive health services with potentially detrimental impact
on their health and lives.”).
92. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
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parties . . . should remove existing barriers . . . caused as a result of the
exercise of conscientious objection by individual medical providers.”94
In 2010, for example, the HRC expressed concern about Poland’s
“conscience clause,” which it described as “often inappropriately
applied” and inhibiting access to safe, legal abortions.95
On the national level, legal conscientious objection protections
abound in Europe.96 This trend pervades despite the fact that the
ECtHR is “not a soaring champion of religious freedom.”97 In the
context of abortion, the ECtHR has addressed Article 9 rights (almost
identical to those in the ICCPR’s Article 18) in states where
conscientious objection rights are guaranteed and those where it is not
legally protected.98 But its treatment of each has been inconsistent.
In P. & S. v. Poland,99 the ECtHR issued a judgment respecting,
in principle, a Polish law providing physicians with a procedure for
raising a conscientious objection to personally participating in an
abortion.100 On the facts presented, however, the Strasbourg Court
found the physicians did not properly comply with the procedure,
resulting in the abortion-seeking applicants receiving “misleading and
contradictory information” and enduring an experience “marred by
procrastination and confusion.”101 As a result, the ECtHR invoked the
Tysi c principle of accessibility102 and found Poland had failed to
comply with its “positive obligation to secure to the applicants effective

94. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 70, ¶ 8.
95. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40
of the Covenant, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/POL/CO/6 (Nov. 15, 2010).
96. Paola Tamma, Even Where Abortion Is Legal, Access Is Not Granted, EUR. DATA
JOURNALISM NETWORK (May 24, 2018), https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/
Data-news/Even-where-abortion-is-legal-access-is-not-granted [https://perma.cc/YYE4-W3S3]
(presenting data indicating that as of 2018, at least twenty-one states in Europe legally protect
conscientious objection, and five states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, and
Sweden) do not permit conscientious objections to performing abortions).
97. Stijn Smet, Conscientious Objection Under the European Convention on Human Rights:
The Ugly Duckling of a Flightless Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 282, 282 (Jeroen Temperman, Jeremy Gunn &
Malcolm Evans eds., 2019).
98. See infra notes 99–117 and accompanying text.
99. P. & S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08 (Oct. 30, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001114098 [https://perma.cc/S396-CGME].
100. Id. ¶ 107.
101. Id. ¶ 108.
102. Tysi c v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, ¶ 116 (Mar. 20, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-79812 [https://perma.cc/6XK8-TE3T].
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respect for their private life.”103 Nonetheless, the ECtHR did not
question the physicians’ rights to conscientiously object to performing
abortions; it merely took issue with the ways in which physicians
exercised such rights.104
The Strasbourg Court did not, however, employ the same analysis
in 2020, when it declined to uphold conscientious objection rights in
Sweden. In both Grimmark v. Sweden105 and Steen v. Sweden,106 the
ECtHR considered claims by midwives who sought to opt out of
performing abortions contrary to a Swedish law that requires
employees to perform all employer-prescribed duties.107 The ECtHR
reasoned the interference with freedom of religion was justified by the
“legitimate aim of protecting the health of women seeking an
abortion,” and the law was “necessary in a democratic society and
proportionate” to this aim.108 But the ECtHR’s analysis was
conclusory. The Strasbourg Court merely stated that, given the state’s
positive obligation to ensure abortion access,109 a “requirement that all
midwives should be able to perform all duties inherent to the vacant
posts was not disproportionate or unjustified.”110 Thus, Sweden had
struck a “proper balance . . . between the different, competing
interests.”111
The Strasbourg Court declined to reconcile its reasoning with, or
even acknowledge, P. & S. In contrast to the Polish law permitting
conscience objection in P. & S.,112 the Swedish law was more
categorical—it required employees to perform duties associated with
their positions without providing any process for exercising
103. P. & S., App. No. 57375/08, ¶¶ 96, 112. This was an Article 8 violation. Id. ¶ 12.
104. See id. ¶ 107 (accepting the existence of Polish law permitting conscience objection but
determining the physicians had not complied with the “procedural requirements” of that law).
105. Grimmark v. Sweden, App. No. 43726/17 (Feb. 11, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-201915 [https://perma.cc/52HH-UA7J].
106. Steen v. Sweden, App. No. 62309/17 (Feb. 11, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001201732 [https://perma.cc/QP8X-NJWH].
107. Grimmark, App. No. 43726/17, ¶ 25; Steen, App. No. 62309/17, ¶ 20.
108. Grimmark, App. No. 43726/17, ¶¶ 25–26; Steen, App. No. 62309/17, ¶¶ 20–21.
109. See Grimmark, App. No. 43726/17, ¶ 26 (stating that Sweden “has a positive obligation
to organise its health system in a way as to ensure that the effective exercise of freedom of
conscience of health professionals in the professional context does not prevent the provision of
[abortion] services”); Steen, App. No. 62309/17, ¶ 21 (same).
110. Grimmark, App. No. 43726/17, ¶ 26; Steen, App. No. 62309/17, ¶ 21.
111. Grimmark, App. No. 43726/17, ¶ 27; Steen, App. No. 62309/17, ¶ 22.
112. P. & S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, ¶¶ 107–08 (Oct. 30, 2012), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-114098 [https://perma.cc/S396-CGME].
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conscientious objection rights.113 To reconcile its decision with P. & S.,
the ECtHR should have inquired as to whether the Swedish midwives’
desire to opt out of performing abortions meaningfully limited
abortion access for pregnant women.114 Although at least one scholar
has interpreted the Swedish cases as “clarifying that there is no right
under the [ECHR] for healthcare providers to refuse to participate in
abortion services,”115 such a categorical conclusion seems unwarranted.
It would require a repudiation of the principles expressed in P. & S.—
which the Strasbourg Court expressly failed to do in both Grimmark
and Steen.116
In sum, some human rights bodies have recognized a right to
conscientious objection—at least when such a right is protected by
domestic law.117 However, when conscientious objection becomes a
barrier to abortion access guaranteed by the domestic law, states are
obliged to balance the rights and ensure abortion is accessible.118 The
recent Swedish cases, however, signify a conceptual gap in the
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, creating uncertainty for both future
abortion access and conscientious objection complaints.

113. Grimmark, App. No. 43726/17, ¶ 25; Steen, App. No. 62309/17, ¶ 20.
114. See P. & S., App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 99 (“[T]he State is under a positive obligation to create
a procedural framework enabling a pregnant woman to effectively exercise her right of access to
lawful abortion.” (citing Tysi c v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, ¶¶ 116–24 (Mar. 20, 2007), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-79812 [https://perma.cc/6XK8-TE3T])).
115. Niklas Barke, Grimmark v. Sweden and Steen v. Sweden: No Right for Healthcare
Professionals To Refuse To Participate in Abortion Services, and Framing Strategies by AntiAbortion Actors, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Apr. 6, 2020), https://strasbourgobservers.com/
2020/04/06/grimmark-v-sweden-and-steen-v-sweden-no-right-for-healthcare-professionals-to-ref
use-to-participate-in-abortion-services-and-framing-strategies-by-anti-abortion-actors [https://
perma.cc/6G5B-VTLG].
116. See generally Grimmark, App. No. 43726/17 (failing to cite or acknowledge the P. & S.
decision); Steen, App. No. 62309/17 (same).
117. This has become the legal norm in human rights. See Zampas & Andión-Ibañez, supra
note 91, at 232 (“According to established international human rights and medical standards,
states should regulate conscientious objection to both accommodate health care providers’ beliefs
and also ensure women’s access to adequate and timely sexual and reproductive health care
services.”).
118. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14 (2000) on the Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12), ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11,
2000) (stating that affordability, information accessibility, and physical accessibility are necessary
to realize the right to health); P. & S., App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 99 (“[T]he State is under a positive
obligation to create a procedural framework enabling a pregnant woman to effectively exercise
her right of access to lawful abortion.”).
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C. Principle III: Fetal Interests, Not Fetal Rights
The international human rights law community has reached a
general consensus that “human rights begin at birth.”119 And the
ECtHR has directly addressed the question of fetal rights. In 2004, in
Vo v. France,120 the ECtHR determined a fetus was not a “person”
within the scope of the ECHR’s Article 2 right to life.121 Further, it
noted that even “if the unborn do have a ‘right’ to ‘life,’ it is implicitly
limited by the mother’s rights and interests.”122 The ECtHR
nevertheless acknowledged a fetus’s “lack of a clear legal status does
not necessarily deprive it of all protection.”123 Specifically, the ECtHR
was careful not to “rule[] out the possibility that in certain
circumstances safeguards may be extended to the unborn child.”124 This
unsatisfying conclusion does clarify at least two issues. First, under the
ECHR, fetuses are not guaranteed right to life protections. Second,
despite not being persons—and thus rightsholders—fetuses certainly
have interests, which the ECtHR is willing to consider.
The U.N. treaty monitoring bodies have weighed in on this issue
in an important context: whether impaired or disabled fetuses are
afforded human rights protections. The Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD Committee”) issued observations
on Hungary’s proposed abortion law in 2012.125 The CRPD Committee
challenged a provision allowing a longer time window for women to
decide whether to abort disabled fetuses than that available to women
119. E.g., Rhonda Copelon, Christina Zampas, Elizabeth Brusie & Jacqueline deVore,
Human Rights Begin at Birth: International Law and the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 REPROD.
HEALTH MATTERS 120, 120, 126 (2005); Rebecca J. Cook & Bernard M. Dickens, Human Rights
Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 22–28 (2003); see also Philip Alston, The
Unborn Child and Abortion Under the Draft of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 HUM.
RTS. Q. 156, 178 (1990) (“[O]n the issue of the status of the unborn child, the Convention [on the
Rights of the Child] conforms with existing international human rights law. While recognizing
that the fetus is deserving of appropriate protection, its right to life per se is not recognized.”
(footnote omitted)).
120. Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00 (July 8, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00161887 [https://perma.cc/C7R5-JL26].
121. Id. ¶ 80; see id. ¶ 85 (“[I]t is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to
answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of
Article 2 . . . .”).
122. Id. ¶ 80.
123. Id. ¶ 86.
124. Id. ¶ 80.
125. Comm. on the Rts. of Pers. with Disabilities, Concluding Observations on the Initial
Periodic Review of Hungary, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/HUN/CO/1 (Oct. 22, 2012).
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deciding whether to abort nondisabled fetuses.126 This, the CRPD
Committee determined, constituted discrimination on the basis of
disability.127 The CRPD Committee subsequently recommended
Hungary “abolish the distinction . . . on the protection of the life of the
fœtus in the period allowed under law within which a pregnancy can be
terminated, based solely on disability.”128 The CRPD Committee’s
concern thus appeared to be with a law that is more permissive of
aborting fetuses with disabilities, not with a blanket law permitting
abortion of disabled and nondisabled fetuses on equal terms. Professor
Carole J. Petersen offers two interpretations of the CRPD
Committee’s statements.129 First, she suggests the CRPD Committee
was recognizing fetal rights to be free from discrimination, which would
be a “departure from the predominant approach in international
law.”130 Alternatively, Petersen proposes the CRPD Committee
believed “permitting abortion on the ground of fetal impairment
devalues, and therefore discriminates against, people who are already
living with disabilities.”131
By 2018, however, the CRPD Committee appeared to step back
from fetal rights, or even interests, in its reproductive freedom
discourse. Pro-life advocates have been disappointed by the CRPD
Committee’s overall failure (in the context of prior statements) to
“state[] that abortion is a violation of the right to life . . . [or] that
disabled persons should be protected from abortion altogether.”132 In
126. See id. ¶ 17 (explaining that the Hungarian law “makes ‘abortive treatment possible for
a wider circle than in general for the fœtuses deemed to have health damage or some disability’”
(quoting Comm. on the Rts. of Pers. with Disabilities, Implementation of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/HUN/1 (June 28, 2011))).
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 18.
129. Carole J. Petersen, Reproductive Justice, Public Policy, and Abortion on the Basis of Fetal
Impairment: Lessons from International Human Rights Law and the Potential Impact on the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, J.L. & HEALTH 121, 154–55, 159 (2015).
130. Id. at 159.
131. Id.
132. Susan Yoshihara, Another UN Committee Says Abortion May Be a Right, But Not on the
Basis of Disability, CTR. FOR FAM. & HUM. RTS. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/
another-un-committee-says-abortion-may-right-not-basis-disability [https://perma.cc/B4AV-JNW7].
As a result, critics interpret the CRPD as saying an abortion due to fetal disability is acceptable
as long as the stated purpose of the abortion “is not eugenic.” Id. These critiques were grounded
in the CRPD’s request that the HRC remove language about fetal impairment from its draft
general comment. Id. The original language stated, “States parties must provide safe access to
abortion to protect the life and health of pregnant women, and in situations in which carrying a
pregnancy to term would cause the woman substantial pain or suffering, most notably where the
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its Concluding Observations on Poland’s Initial Periodic Report, the
CRPD Committee expressed concern about pregnancy terminations
only as they related to “barriers faced by women with disabilities when
they seek to gain access to services for safe abortion.”133 Further, in a
joint statement coauthored by the CEDAW Committee, CRPD
Committee Chairperson Theresia Degener emphasized that
“opponents of reproductive rights and autonomy often actively and
deliberately refer to disability rights in an effort to restrict or prohibit
women’s access to safe abortion.”134 Such behavior, she explained, is a
“misinterpretation” of the CRPD.135 Throughout the statement, which
expressed the need for “safe and legal abortion,” Degener did not offer
any qualifications in the case of fetal disability.136 In fact, no mention
was made of either fetal rights or interests.137 Taking these recent
statements together with other sources of human rights law,138 the
authorities agree: fetuses may have interests, but they do not have
human rights.
But how are these interests represented? Scholars have identified
the state as an operative actor here, particularly in the context of fetal
impairments.139 Further, the ECtHR has confirmed pregnant women
do not necessarily safeguard fetal interests, especially as there may be
conflicts with pregnant women’s rights.140 In Vo, the ECtHR left open
pregnancy is the result of rape or incest or when the foetus suffers from fatal impairment.” Hum.
Rts. Comm., Advance Unedited Version of General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life ¶ 9, www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GCArticle6/GCArticle6_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTM4-BTET].
133. Comm. on the Rts. of Pers. with Disabilities, Concluding Observations on the Initial
Periodic Review of Poland, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/POL/CO/1 (Oct. 29, 2018).
134. OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 64.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See infra notes 144–45.
139. See, e.g., Rosamund Scott, The English Fetus and the Right to Life, 11 EUR. J. HEALTH
L. 347, 356 (2004) (discussing how the state can protect fetal interests without recognizing rights
through the provision of unbiased, factual information on fetal disability to pregnant women
considering abortions); Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in THE
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 97–98 (4th ed. 2013) (concluding that a priority in addressing
selective abortion on the basis of fetal disability should be informing but not restricting a patient’s
choice).
140. See A, B & C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, ¶ 213 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102332 [https://perma.cc/4HSJ-4LTD] (“The woman’s right to
respect for her private life must be weighed against other competing rights and freedoms invoked
including those of the unborn child . . . .”); Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00, ¶ 80 (July 8, 2004),
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the possibility that “in certain circumstances safeguards may be
extended” to fetuses.141 In other words, even though fetuses are not
rightsholders, they are “not necessarily deprive[d] . . . of all
protection.”142 It logically follows if pregnant women are unable to
always represent fetal interests, and if international human rights law
binds states not individuals, the state may represent fetal interests in
the reproductive freedom context. This is not to say the state may not
delegate such responsibility. Borrowing from the legal framework in
the children’s rights context,143 fetal interests may be represented, for
example, by domestic court officers, guardians ad litem, health or social
services inspectors, or even medical professionals.
Ultimately, even though some continue to argue human rights
drafters “were mindful that birth was not to be the starting point for
legal personality,”144 neither the core U.N. human rights treaties nor
the ECHR expressly recognize fetal rights.145 As a result, the human
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61887 [https://perma.cc/T23R-QPPD] (“[T]he unborn child
is not regarded as a ‘person’ directly protected by Article 2 of the Convention and . . . if the
unborn do have a ‘right’ to ‘life’, it is implicitly limited by the mother’s rights and interests.”).
141. Vo, App. No. 53924/00, ¶ 80.
142. Id. ¶ 86.
143. See, e.g., Ursula Kilkelly, The Best of Both Worlds for Children’s Rights? Interpreting the
European Convention on Human Rights in the Light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 308, 325 (2001) (discussing how to actualize “independent representation
for children,” which is secured by Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child); Paul
McCafferty, Implementing Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
in Child Protection Decision-Making: A Critical Analysis of the Challenges and Opportunities for
Social Work, 23 CHILD CARE IN PRAC. 327, 328–29 (2017) (emphasizing the role of social work
in representing children’s interests under the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
144. Delphine Loiseau, For the Recognition of the Legal Personality of the Foetus in Utero,
EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST. (Apr. 2020), https://eclj.org/abortion/echr/pour-la-reconnaissance-dela-personnalite-juridique-du-ftus-in-utero [https://perma.cc/F69D-Z2YC].
145. Copelon et al., supra note 119, at 120. Importantly, the U.N. and European human rights
systems recognize children’s rights. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3; EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. & COUNCIL OF EUR., HANDBOOK
ON EUROPEAN LAW RELATING TO THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 3 (2015). The Committee on the
Rights of the Child’s recognition of the importance of abortion access for pregnant children
affirms that it does not recognize fetal rights. See, e.g., Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Concluding
Observations, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.107 (Aug. 24, 1999) (expressing concern of the
negative impacts of illegal abortion and punitive abortion laws on pregnant adolescent girls).
Notably, the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) does appear to recognize fetal
rights. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1) Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36
(“Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and,
in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
(emphasis added)). But the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has since clarified that this
provision does not preclude a right to abortion. See Murillo v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections,
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rights landscape confirms fetuses are not rightsholders, though states
may still take fetal interests in account when shaping policies and
decisions.146
D. Summarizing the Principles
Derived from the existing human rights landscape, Principles I, II,
and III clarify the relevant stakeholders in any issue implicating
abortion and pregnancy rights. Table 1 provides an overview of the
principles, summarizing their essence and to whom they most directly
apply.
Table 1: Overview of Principles
Relevant Human Rights
Guarantees
Right to access abortion
services when abortion is
Principle I: The
legal under domestic law;
Right to
Pregnant women
right to exercise agency
Reproductive
over reproductive decisions
Freedom
throughout pregnancy and
birth
Right to conscientious
Principle II: The
objection when protected
Right to
by domestic law to the
Medical professionals
Conscientious
extent that exercise of the
Objection
right does not inhibit
abortion access
Recognition of fetal
Principle III:
interests (not fetal rights),
Fetal Interests, Fetuses
which may be represented
Not Fetal Rights
by the state or its delegates
Stakeholder

Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 223 (Nov. 28,
2012) (“[T]he historic and systematic interpretation of precedents that exist in the inter-American
system confirms that it is not admissible to grant the status of person to the embryo.”); see also
Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L./
V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. ¶¶ 20–30 (1981) (concluding that, based on the ACHR’s drafting history,
Article 4 does not impose legal restrictions on abortion on the basis of fetal rights to life).
146. See supra notes 121–143 and accompanying text.
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But this table reveals a number of critical questions that remain
unanswered. The most pressing is whether and how the state can
safeguard fetal interests without infringing upon the human rights of
pregnant women and medical care providers.
As the preceding discussion reveals, where domestic law provides
for access to abortion services or conscientious objection in the
healthcare context, those legal protections are recognized and ensured
by international human rights law. The subsequent application of these
principles to specific case studies will explore how states should grapple
with balancing positive and negative obligations, the rights and
interests of relevant stakeholders, and domestic law and policy in the
reproductive healthcare context.
III. A BALANCING ACT: RETHINKING EUGENIC ABORTIONS &
HOME BIRTHS AT THE ECTHR
As the discussion in Part II demonstrates, the ECtHR is no
stranger to reproductive health and agency matters. In determining the
breadth of states’ margin of appreciation, the ECtHR has thus far
avoided providing answers to related moral and ethical questions.147
But two important dimensions of reproductive healthcare—eugenic
abortions and home births—are presently implicated in cases pending
at the ECtHR. Although raising distinct parts of reproductive health,
these two issues concern the same set of key stakeholders: pregnant
women, medical professionals, and fetuses. This Part engages with the
background and current status of each issue. It then engages the human
rights principles derived in Part II to recommend a framework for the
ECtHR to apply in resolving the rights and interests conflicts inherent
in both types of disputes.
A. Eugenic Abortions
Selective abortions on the basis of fetal impairment have garnered
increasing concern in both Europe and the United States.148

147. Ryan, supra note 48, at 473–74.
148. See, e.g., Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, No. 19-2690, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
84, at *24 (8th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021) (Shepherd, J., concurring) (requesting that the U.S. Supreme
Court reverse its precedent on abortion in order to uphold an Arkansas law banning abortions of
fetuses diagnosed with or expected to have Down syndrome, else precedent serve as “a tool of
modern-day eugenics” (citation omitted)); Pasquale Toscano & Alexis Doyle, Legal Abortion
Isn’t the Problem To Be Solved, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
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Conservative activists have termed these pregnancy terminations
“eugenic abortions.”149 This Note adopts use of this term,
acknowledging the loaded rhetoric intrinsic to its connotations but
recognizing the value in clarity and identifying exactly how opposition
to these abortions is currently framed. As a result, this Note engages
with the term “eugenic abortions” to refer to all decisions to terminate
pregnancies caused in whole or in part by a diagnosis or suspicion of
fetal disability, including both impairments that may result in death
prior to, during, or soon after birth (e.g., fatal holoprosencephaly) and
those that are associated with longevity (e.g., Down syndrome or cystic
fibrosis).150 This definition thus only encompasses abortions
characterized by conditions of a fetus as opposed to conditions of a
pregnant woman.151
1. Relevant Case Law and State Practice. Even though the ECtHR
has yet to confront laws directly implicating eugenic abortions, several
prior decisions are relevant in considering how it may approach
pending and future cases. First, as discussed in Part II, in Tysi c, the
ECtHR clarified that once abortion is permitted by a state’s domestic
law, the state has a positive obligation under Article 8 to ensure
abortions are accessible.152 But the ECtHR also acknowledged that in
striking a “fair balance . . . between the competing interests of the

archive/2019/06/selective-abortion-bans-treat-disability-tragedy/592000 [https://perma.cc/6A7RMJD3] (“[A]bortion-rights opponents are reinforcing the dangerous idea that disabilities are an
unbearable burden and, in the absence of government coercion, might be snuffed out
altogether.”); Patryk Regalski, Eugenic Abortion Before the Polish Constitutional Court, EUR.
CTR. FOR L. & JUST. (Nov. 2020), https://eclj.org/eugenics/eu/lavortement-eugenique-devant-letribunal-constitutionnel-polonais [https://perma.cc/3X9R-V69M] (describing the then-pending
decision of the Polish Constitutional Court on outlawing selective abortions on the basis of fetal
impairment as a decision “of great importance” that “will no doubt be followed by another
decision, this time by the U.S. Supreme Court”).
149. E.g., Regalski, supra note 148; Puppinck, supra note 5.
150. See discussion supra note 5. The definition of “eugenic abortion” may be expanded to
include abortion decisions based on fetal race or sex, but these considerations are beyond the
scope of this Note.
151. As a result, this Note focuses on any eugenic abortions, regardless of how the pregnant
woman might be characterized under abortion laws. In other words, there is no difference, for
these purposes, between a woman seeking a eugenic abortion after she became pregnant on
purpose and one seeking a eugenic abortion after she became pregnant via rape or incest.
152. Tysi c v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, ¶ 116 (Mar. 20, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-79812 [https://perma.cc/MK35-W2LL].
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individual and of the community as a whole[,] . . . the State enjoys a
certain margin of appreciation.”153
Seven years later, the ECtHR faced, but side-stepped, eugenic
abortion as a legal matter in A.K. v. Latvia.154 The applicant had given
birth to a child with Down syndrome.155 She alleged Latvian physicians
had denied her prompt and adequate medical care by not providing her
with antenatal screening tests; due to her age, she was guaranteed a
certain level of antenatal care under Latvian law.156 The applicant
stated had she known, via antenatal screening tests, of the fetal
impairment, she would have obtained an abortion.157 In the closest it
has come to the eugenic abortion issue, the ECtHR found there had
been an Article 8 violation on procedural grounds, but it did not
address legal issues of eugenic abortions, which were not regulated
under Latvian law.158
More recently, significant changes impacting eugenic abortions
are occurring in two European states. In October 2020, the highest
court in Poland ruled a domestic law permitting abortions for fetuses
with impairments later in a pregnancy than for nonimpaired fetuses
was unconstitutional.159 As 98 percent of abortions obtained in 2019
were carried out under this provision, this decision effectively outlaws
all nontherapeutic abortions not involving rape or incest.160 The ruling
153. Id. ¶ 111.
154. A.K. v. Latvia, App. No. 33011/08 (June 24, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001145005 [https://perma.cc/3FM8-TH6K].
155. Id. ¶ 11.
156. Id. ¶¶ 66–67.
157. Id. ¶ 30.
158. See id. ¶ 94 (“[T]he domestic courts[] . . . did not properly examine the applicant’s claim
that she had not received medical care and information in accordance with domestic law in a
manner sufficient to ensure the protection of her interests.”). Importantly, this did not stop
intervening conservative groups like the European Centre for Law and Justice from raising the
issue. See id. ¶¶ 79–83 (describing the third-party submission as alleging “screening for genetic
diseases in order to eliminate the [fetus] rather than cure the diseases constituted a systemic
incitement to discrimination and violence on the grounds of disability”).
159. Wyrok [Judgment] TK [Constitutional Tribunal] z [of] Oct. 22, 2020, K 1/20 (Pol.), https:/
/trybunal.gov.pl/postepowanie-i-orzeczenia/wyroki/art/11300-planowanie-rodziny-ochrona-plod
u-ludzkiego-i-warunki-dopuszczalnosci-przerywania-ciazy [https://perma.cc/YP3D-99DF] (translated
by Google Translate); Monika Scislowska, Poland’s Top Court Rules Out Abortions Due to Fetal
Defects, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 22, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/international-newspoland-abortion-europe-birth-defects-9258358858a72911663cd1d276a8fbd2 [https://perma.cc/PF5KCGZ3].
160. Poland Abortion Ban: Thousands Protest for Third Day, BBC (Jan. 29, 2021), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55866162 [https://perma.cc/86FG-7ZRG]. Prior to this ruling,
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garnered approval from the European Centre for Law and Justice
(“ECLJ”), a conservative nongovernmental organization, which
described it as lifesaving and a step towards eradicating discrimination
on the basis of disability.161 But the decision also provoked mass
protests across Poland.162 Notably, “Polish feminists with disabilities
stressed that pitting reproductive rights against disability rights
discounts the perspectives of women with disabilities and undermines
the human rights approach to disability rights as encapsulated in the
[CRPD].”163 In October 2021, the ECtHR communicated twelve
applications challenging Poland’s law under Article 8 of the ECHR.164
In Hungary, which has similar abortion laws to Poland, the
Constitutional Court recently declined to further consider a similar
issue in the context of interpreting a domestic statute’s conditions for
when a fetus is considered disabled and thus abortable.165 The case
arose in the context of tort law; parents of a disabled child brought suit
against the hospital where their disabled child was born, requesting

only approximately one thousand abortions were performed annually in Poland, which already
had “one of Europe’s most restrictive abortion laws.” Poland: Regression on Abortion Cases
Harms Women, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan. 26, 2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/
poland-regression-on-abortion-access-harms-women [https://perma.cc/M8E3-DXMH]. As a result,
even prior to the decision, “thousands of women [would] leave Poland to access abortion care in
other European countries, while others [would] import medical abortion pills or seek extra-legal
abortion in Poland.” Id. Now, however, Poland has eliminated one of the few remaining legal
grounds for abortion, exacerbating these dangerous trends. Id.
161. Grégor Puppinck, Poland: The End of Eugenic Abortion, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST.
(Dec. 2020), https://eclj.org/eugenics/eu/pologne—le-tribunal-constitutionnel-abroge-lavortemen
t-eugenique [https://perma.cc/4YHX-D9NB].
162. Monika Pronczuk, Isabella Kwai & Anatol Magdziarz, ‘Declaration of War’: Protesters
in Poland Vow To Fight Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/28/world/europe/poland-protests-abortion-ban.html [https://perma.cc/B46H-H73L].
163. Magda Szarota & Suzannah Phillips, In Battle over Abortion, Polish Feminists with
Disabilities Are Claiming Their Rights, MS. MAG. (Dec. 15, 2020), https://msmagazine.com/2020/
12/15/abortion-poland-polish-feminists-women-with-disabilities-fetal-defect [https://perma.cc/88FRYVLD]; see id. (“[M]eaningful reproductive autonomy is a priority for women with disabilities all
around the world, both as women and persons with disabilities, and access to abortion is an
important part of that reproductive autonomy—and more broadly of their inherent and
inalienable right to dignity.”).
164. Notification of 12 Applications Concerning Abortion Rights in Poland, EUR. CT. OF HUM.
RTS. (July 8, 2021), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-7074470-9562874 [https://perma.cc/
FBV6-KS5B].
165. Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just., The Hungarian Constitutional Court Rejected the Initiative
Against Abortion Law, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST. (May 2021) [hereinafter ECLJ, Rejected
Initiative], https://eclj.org/abortion/eu/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-refused-to-accept-theinitiative-against-abortion-law [https://perma.cc/NRU5-56K2].
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damages for “wrongful birth of their child.”166 The ECLJ submitted an
amicus brief to the Constitutional Court, arguing eugenic abortion
itself is a violation of international human rights law.167 The ECLJ’s
analysis relied largely on the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and rights under the ECHR, and its conclusions were premised on fetal
rights being considered within the scope of children’s, and other
natural persons’, rights.168 But the Constitutional Court chose not to
hear the case in the spring of 2021 on procedural, not substantive,
grounds.169 Nonetheless, the ECLJ emphasizes the high number of
dissenting judges, implying there is room for future eugenic abortion
challenges to reach the bench.170
2. Applying Human Rights Law Principles to Eugenic Abortions.
Although the ECtHR has thus far avoided ruling on the legality of
eugenic abortions, recent case law and state practice imply a decision

166. Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just., Hungary: Wrongful Birth Compensation?, EUR. CTR. FOR L. &
JUST. (Jan. 2021), https://eclj.org/abortion/eu/prejudice-detre-ne—la-loi-hongroise-sur-lacces-alavortement-devant-la-cour-constitutionnelle?lng=en [https://perma.cc/UQC7-QGCR].
167. Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just., Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Constitutional Court of
Hungary in the Case No. III/01838/2020, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST. 8 (Jan. 2021) [hereinafter
ECLJ, Amicus Curiae Brief], https://eclj.org/abortion/eu/constitutional-court-of-hungary-noiii/
01838/2020 [https://perma.cc/45W3-7QRS]. This argument was based in part upon Hungary’s
October 2020 signature to the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health
and Strengthening Families, which was also signed by Poland and the United States under the
Trump administration, and espouses a commitment to restrict abortion access. Joint Statement
Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family (WHA 73), U.S. MISSION TO INT’L
ORGS. IN GENEVA, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/11/11/joint-statement-promoting-womenshealth-and-strengthening-the-family-wha-73 [https://perma.cc/J6J9-HCT3]. Thirty-one additional
states were signatories; these are described as “largely authoritarian governments.” Julian Borger,
US Signs Anti-Abortion Declaration with Group of Largely Authoritarian Governments,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2020, 1:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/22/us-trumpadministration-signs-anti-abortion-declaration [https://perma.cc/28H5-7V2L]. In January 2021,
President Joe Biden removed the United States from the instrument. Memorandum on Protecting
Women’s Health at Home and Abroad, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.whit
ehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/memorandum-on-protecting-womenshealth-at-home-and-abroad [https://perma.cc/LPF3-WEQQ].
168. See ECLJ, Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 167, at 4 (relying on the Convention on the
Rights of the Child); see also id. at 5 (implying the ECtHR, by acknowledging “legitimate interests
involved” in abortion disputes, should take the next step by prohibiting abortions).
169. ECLJ, Rejected Initiative, supra note 165.
170. See id. (“It is clear from the dissenting opinions how much the issue divides the panel.
Moreover, the rejection was not based on the merits of the case but merely on procedural
inadequacy. Hopefully this leaves room for opportunity for the future ban of eugenic abortion as
it has happened in Poland.”).
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on the issue may be imminent.171 By identifying the relevant
stakeholders and applying the core relevant principles of international
human rights law developed in Part II, this Subsection proposes a guide
for the ECtHR to follow when reviewing a national law on eugenic
abortions which seeks to protect fetal interests and ensure the requisite
rights guarantees. The analysis below assumes that a state both permits
some abortions and recognizes conscientious objection under its
domestic law, as most Council of Europe states do.172
First, the Strasbourg Court should identify the three key
stakeholders and their respective rights and interests: pregnant women,
fetuses, and medical care providers. Pregnant women in a state where
abortion is legal have an undisputed right to reproductive agency.173
Fetuses have no rights under Article 8, but they do have interests.174 In
the context of eugenic abortion, these interests could be in both life
and nondiscrimination on the basis of disability. Medical care providers
have their own rights to conscientious objection175 and, in exercising
those rights, may serve as a proxy for fetal interests. Assuming the
relevant state permits both abortion and conscientious objection under
its domestic law, it must perform a balancing act in line with Part II’s
core human rights principles. In reviewing the balance struck, the
ECtHR must identify the discretionary space within which the state
may prescribe policies to regulate the relevant rights and interests.
Next, the ECtHR should examine the state’s positive and negative
obligations—the actions it must and must not take. Principle I clarifies
171. Notably, two communicated complaints have tangentially raised eugenic abortion as an
issue, but neither have directly challenged the legality of eugenic abortion, unlike the Polish
situation, and are thus not covered by the scope of this analysis. See generally B.B. v. Poland, App.
No. 67171/17 (Jan. 29, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-201485 [https://perma.cc/CFM8VPHN] (alleging Polish physicians intentionally prevented the applicant from obtaining an
abortion after she discovered her fetus was disabled by wielding their conscientious objection
rights); De Pracomtal v. France, App. Nos. 34701/17, 35133/17 (Aug. 31, 2020), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-204781 [https://perma.cc/X4GE-9FAT] (alleging that the French
censorship of an advertisement containing testimonials from disabled individuals thanking their
mothers constituted discrimination on the basis of disability when the advertisement was removed
due to potential trauma it may cause women who had obtained eugenic abortions).
172. See The World’s Abortion Laws, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (2022), https://maps.reprod
uctiverights.org/worldabortionlaws [https://perma.cc/UX67-KAAN] (mapping liberal abortion
laws across much of Europe); Eur. Parl. Ass., Resolution 1763, 35th Sess., Doc. No. 12347 (2010)
(concluding that “[t]here is a comprehensive and clear legal and policy framework governing the
practice of conscientious objection by health-care providers” in “the vast majority of Council of
Europe member states”).
173. See supra Part II.A.
174. See supra Part II.C.
175. See supra notes 90–118 and accompanying text.
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the state cannot materially restrict abortion access once it has legalized
abortion. In positive terms, this means that, to the extent abortion is
legal, the state must ensure abortions are accessible within its
jurisdiction. Further, Principle III provides the state cannot limit
eugenic abortions on the basis of fetal rights (as opposed to interests).
Taken together, these principles indicate a state that has legalized
abortion has a negative obligation not to restrict eugenic abortions
either directly (by prohibiting eugenic abortions on the basis of fetal
rights) or indirectly (by permitting providers to exercise their rights to
conscientious objection in ways that make eugenic abortions
inaccessible). The state thus has a positive obligation to ensure the
accessibility of all legal abortions, including eugenic abortions, to the
extent abortion is legal in the general sense. As a result, domestic
regulations governing abortion cannot distinguish between eugenic
and non-eugenic abortions without running afoul of Principles I and
III.
Next, the ECtHR should consider what a state may do within the
bounds of both international human rights law and its margin of
appreciation. To operate appropriately within this discretionary space
in which pregnant women’s rights to reproductive autonomy
(protected by Article 8) and medical care providers’ rights to
conscientious objection (protected by Article 9) are implicated, the
state must have a legitimate aim, and its regulations must be necessary
and proportional to achieving this legitimate aim.176 Both articles
indicate “the protection of health or morals” and “the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others” constitute legitimate aims of the state.177
But because there are no fetal rights under Article 8 according to
Principle III, fetal interests may be encompassed only by the health and
morals justification. Further, the lack of fetal rights precludes a rights
clash between pregnant women, who are rightsholders under Principle
I, and fetuses, who are not rightsholders. As a result, the only rights
clash remaining under the ECHR is between pregnant women and
objecting medical professionals.178 The presence of fetal interests
nonetheless complicates this dynamic; their amorphous and openended nature may, as shown below, lead states to claim a fairly broad
margin of appreciation in an attempt to shield their laws and policies
from international judicial scrutiny.
176. See supra Part I.
177. European Convention on Human Rights arts. 8(2), 9(2), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005.
178. See supra Part II.
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In achieving balance, several policy routes are available. In line
with Principle III, the state may, for example, provide pregnant women
with objective, truthful, and non-misleading information about a
child’s quality of life with disability as resources relevant to making an
informed decision. The state may also, in accordance with Principle II,
permit medical care providers to opt out of performing eugenic
abortions as long as the state ensures, via its positive obligations,
pregnant women will nonetheless be able to access providers willing to
perform such abortions. In these two areas, the state has room to shape
specific policies in light of national interests and values. For example,
the state can regulate the type of disability-related information, if any,
that is provided to pregnant women in exercising its Principle III
obligations.
With regard to conscientious objections, the state may permit, but
not require, medical care providers to freely inquire about the reasons
why a pregnant woman is seeking an abortion, engaging Principles II
and III. Similarly, the state may provide a notification system to ensure
that abortion is not becoming inaccessible in certain geographic areas
by monitoring the number of conscientious objection requests relative
to abortion demand. In contrast to the more categorical direct and
indirect regulations that the state expressly cannot enact, these policies
are more likely to satisfy the margin of appreciation’s necessity and
proportionality standard. The state may frame these as necessary to
achieve the legitimate aim of protecting morals (safeguarding fetal
interests), but these policies are proportionate in that they neither
restrict women’s access to abortion (Principles I and II) nor demote
women’s rights below medical care providers’ conscientious objection
rights and fetuses’ interests (Principle III). As a result, the state may
safeguard fetal interests in the context of eugenic abortion, but it must
do so without infringing upon the rights ensured under international
human rights law.
B. Home Births
Both human rights law and the ECtHR have clarified the right to
reproductive freedom encompasses not only decisions about whether
to continue a pregnancy and give birth, but also decisions about where
to give birth.179 Researchers have found there is psychological value for
179. See Ternovszky v. Hungary, App. No. 67545/09, ¶ 24 (Dec. 14, 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102254 [https://perma.cc/3QT8-CK3Z] (“[T]he mother is entitled
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women who feel they were able to exert agency, make choices, and
exercise control over their childbirth experiences.180 Different factors
may influence women’s decisions about where to give birth, including
health care coverage, geographic location, socioeconomic status, and
cultural or religious beliefs.181 Some states have historically enjoyed
particularly high levels of safe home births, and the COVID-19
pandemic in particular has augmented the attractiveness of a home
birth option for many across the world.182 But though human rights law
secures, in Principle I, women’s rights to choose where to give birth,
the ECtHR will decide future home birth cases against a complicated
backdrop of conflicting state practice and case law.
1. Relevant Case Law and State Practice. On a macrolevel, there
is a general divide between Western and Eastern Europe when it
comes to home birth policies.183 In countries like the United Kingdom,
both home births and midwives’ attendance at them are legal.184 The
Netherlands leads Europe in home births; there, giving birth at home,
with the assistance of a midwife or other medical professional, is the
standard practice for uncomplicated pregnancies.185 Eastern European
states, on the other hand, have taken a narrower approach to the
legality of home births.
to a legal and institutional environment that enables her choice [in childbirth], except where other
rights render necessary the restriction thereof.”).
180. Katie Cook & Colleen Loomis, The Impact of Choice and Control on Women’s
Childbirth Experiences, 21 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 158, 158 (2012).
181. Jane Sandall, Place of Birth in Europe, 81 ENTRE NOUS 16, 16–17 (2015).
182. Julia Ries, Interest in Home Births Rises During the COVID-19 Pandemic, HEALTHLINE
(June 17, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health/pregnancy/home-births-rise-with-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/93AV-RTHK].
183. Notably, this is far from the only area in human rights where such a divide exists between
Western Europe and more recent signatories to the ECHR. See, e.g., Jeff Diamant & Scott
Gardner, In EU, There’s an East-West Divide Over Religious Minorities, Gay Marriage, National
Identity, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/29/eastwest-divide-within-the-eu-on-issues-including-minorities-gay-marriage-and-national-identity
[https://perma.cc/B4CZ-SK4K] (“Majorities in all of the surveyed Western European countries
favor same-sex marriage, while majorities in almost all of the Central and Eastern European
countries oppose it.”).
184. Where To Give Birth: The Options, NAT’L HEALTH SERV. (Apr. 8, 2021), https://
www.nhs.uk/pregnancy/labour-and-birth/preparing-for-the-birth/where-to-give-birth-the-options
[https://perma.cc/W7AV-YG6M].
185. See Stephanie van den Berg, Home Birth in the Netherlands: Why the Dutch Cherish
Them, EXPATICA (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.expatica.com/nl/healthcare/womens-health/homebirths-in-the-netherlands-100749 [https://perma.cc/ER3D-769U] (claiming that 30 percent of
women in the Netherlands give birth at home).
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In 2010, the ECtHR decided the aforementioned Ternovszky case
against Hungary.186 The applicant challenged Hungary’s lack of
“comprehensive legislation on home birth,” which she alleged
“effectively dissuade[d] health professionals from assisting those
wishing home birth.”187 The ECtHR ultimately found this lack of
certainty constituted an interference with the applicant’s Article 8
rights.188 Though acknowledging states have a wide margin of
appreciation on most Article 8 matters, the ECtHR explained that
the regulation should ensure a proper balance between societal
interests and the right at stake. In the context of home birth, regarded
as a matter of personal choice of the mother, this implies that the
mother is entitled to a legal and institutional environment that
enables her choice, except where other rights render necessary the
restriction thereof. For the Court, the right to choice in matters of
child delivery includes the legal certainty that the choice is lawful and
not subject to sanctions, directly or indirectly. At the same time, the
Court is aware that, for want of conclusive evidence, it is debated in
medical science whether, in statistical terms, homebirth as such
carries significantly higher risks than giving birth in hospital.189

Ultimately, because pregnant women were limited in their choices
about where to give birth, the ECtHR concluded Hungary’s policy was
incompatible with both “foreseeability” and “lawfulness.”190
Four years later, however, the ECtHR appeared to reverse course.
In Dubská & Krejzová v. Czech Republic,191 the applicant challenged a
Czech law that regulated where healthcare providers could offer
services, including in the context of childbirth.192 The domestic law
imposed liability on midwives who assisted in home births.193 Despite
its decision in Ternovszky and third-party submissions from the World
Health Organization advocating for the general safety of home birth,194

186. Ternovszky v. Hungary, App. No. 67545/09, ¶ 27 (Dec. 14, 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102254 [https://perma.cc/2JGU-GXHF].
187. Id. ¶ 6.
188. Id. ¶ 22.
189. Id. ¶ 24.
190. Id. ¶ 26.
191. Dubská & Krejzová v. Czech Republic, App. Nos. 28859/11, 28473/12 (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148632 [https://perma.cc/WC2P-BFPW].
192. Id. ¶ 82.
193. Id. ¶¶ 37–44.
194. Id. ¶ 57.
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the ECtHR found the Czech law did not constitute an Article 8
violation.195 The ECtHR determined the Czech Republic had a
legitimate aim when interfering with pregnant women’s right to choice
in childbirth—“protect[ing] the health and safety of the newborn
during and after delivery and, at least indirectly, that of the mother.”196
In considering whether the interference was necessary in a democratic
society, the ECtHR concluded the state had a wide margin of
appreciation in part due to the lack of European consensus on home
births.197
Balancing the relevant rights and interests at stake, the ECtHR
determined “while there is generally no conflict of interest between the
mother and her child, certain choices made by the mother as to the
place, circumstances or method of delivery may be seen to give rise to
an increased risk to the health and safety of the newborns.”198 The
ECtHR acknowledged “the majority of the research studies . . . do not
suggest that there is an increased risk for home births compared to
births in a hospital” as long as certain preconditions are present.199
Finding that the state had failed to “carefully consider[] the possible
alternatives and assess[] the proportionality of their policy in respect
of home births,”200 the ECtHR did not clarify why the Czech law could,
or should, not be adapted to permit medical attendance at home births
meeting the preconditions making them safe procedures.201 In his
dissent, Judge Paul Lemmens criticized the majority’s framing of the
Czech state’s obligations as negative ones, and he instead advocated
for applying a positive obligation analysis to the Czech law.202 He
concluded that the relevant question should be “whether the State
195. Id. ¶ 101.
196. Id. ¶ 86.
197. Id. ¶ 93 (“[T]here is no clear common ground amongst the member States . . . and [home
birth regulation] involves general social and economic policy considerations for the State,
including the allocation of financial means . . . .”).
198. Id. ¶ 94.
199. Id. ¶ 96. The preconditions are (1) the pregnancy is low-risk, (2) a qualified midwife
attends the home birth, and (3) if necessary, transport from home to the hospital should be easily
and quickly accessible. Id. The ECtHR continued, arguing that in light of the preconditions, the
Czech situation, “where medical professionals are not allowed to assist mothers who wish to give
birth at home and where no specialised emergency aid is available, may be said to increase rather
than reduce the risk to the life and health of the mother and newborn.” Id.
200. Id. ¶ 99.
201. See id. ¶ 100 (requiring the Czech Republic merely to “keep the relevant provisions
under constant review, reflecting medical, scientific and legal developments”).
202. Id. ¶ 2 (Lemmens, J., dissenting).
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fail[ed] to protect their right to respect for their private life, understood
as including the right to define the circumstances in which one gives
birth.”203
Scholars have struggled to reconcile the ECtHR’s complicated
case law on reproductive health. Professor Fleur van Leeuwen notes
the ECtHR missed an opportunity in Ternovszky to align its home
birth jurisprudence with its abortion jurisprudence.204 Instead of using
a positive obligations framework to conclude Hungary had an
obligation to ensure the accessibility of home birth, which was
permitted under domestic law, the ECtHR simply used a negative
obligations framework to assess whether the Article 8 interference was
justified.205 Dubská further complicated the doctrine. Ternovszky
involved a law that was ambiguous as to the legality of midwives
participating in home births,206 and Dubská involved a law that flatly
prohibited midwives from participating in home births.207 But despite
this technical difference, these decisions nonetheless “suggest[] that
the ECtHR is internally conflicted and inconsistent.”208
Recent decisions have compounded the confusion. In 2018 and
2019, the ECtHR decided Pojatina v. Croatia209 and Kosait - ypien v.

203. Id. Lemmens went on to assess whether despite this positive obligation, a fair balance
had been struck between societal and individual interests, concluding in the negative. Id. ¶¶ 2–6.
He concluded that because women could still choose to give birth at home, but would be
prohibited from having a midwife in attendance, the “system, taken as a whole, can[not] be seen
as compatible with the stated aim of protection of the health of the mothers and their children.”
Id. ¶ 3.
204. Fleur van Leeuwen, Milestone or Stillbirth? An Analysis of The First Judgment of The
European Court of Human Rights on Home Birth, in EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: NOTHING
BUT TROUBLE? 197, 203 (Marjolein van de Brink, Susanne Burri & Jenny Goldschmidt eds.,
2015).
205. Id. Writing prior to Dubská, van Leeuwen expressed hope that Ternovszky provided
“decent” basis upon which the ECtHR “can build in its future judgments” to further ensure the
right of pregnant women to decide where to give birth. Id. at 209.
206. Ternovszky v. Hungary, App. No. 67545/09, ¶ 6 (Dec. 14, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-102254 [https://perma.cc/2JGU-GXHF].
207. Dubská & Krejzová v. Czech Republic, App. Nos. 28859/11, 28473/12, ¶ 82 (Dec. 11,
2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148632 [https://perma.cc/WC2P-BFPW].
208. Chao-Yuan Chen & Marie Cheeseman, European Court of Human Rights Rulings in
Home Birth Set To Cause Trouble for the Future: A Review of Two Cases, 25 MED. L. REV. 115,
124 (2016).
209. Pojatina v. Croatia, App. No. 18568/12 (Oct. 4, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-186446 [https://perma.cc/HF8C-CCPZ].
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Lithuania,210 respectively. Both cases involved domestic legislation like
that in the Czech Republic, prohibiting midwives from assisting with
home births.211 The ECtHR found no violation of Article 8 in both
situations.212 In Kosait - ypien , the ECtHR conducted a legitimate aim
and necessity and proportionality analysis almost identical to that in
Dubská.213 The ECtHR concluded, however, even though pregnant
women technically retained the right to give birth at home—albeit
without medical assistance—under domestic law, “while it would be
possible for [Lithuania] to allow planned home births, it is not required
to do so under the Convention.”214 This statement creates an
inconsistency between home birth and abortion regulation. The
ECtHR is unequivocal: to the extent a state permits abortion, it is
required to ensure abortions are accessible.215 But it has not addressed,
let alone justified, why the same analysis does not apply in the home
birth context—that is, to the extent a state permits home birth, it must
ensure home births are accessible.
Currently, Ioni -Ciurez v. Romania,216 in which the applicant
alleged she was “forced” to give birth in a hospital instead of at home,
is pending before the ECtHR.217 This case will be particularly
significant in the development of home birth jurisprudence because
unlike Dubská, Pojatina, and Kosait - ypien , it does not involve a legal
prohibition on midwives participating in home births.218 Instead, this
case involves a regulatory structure of uncertainty, much like the
Hungarian legal ambiguity at issue in Ternovszky.219 The ECtHR may
choose either to find an Article 8 violation for the same reasons it did
in Ternovszky, completely rebuke its Ternovszky reasoning and

210. Kosait - ypien v. Lithuania, App. No. 69489/12 (June 4, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe. int/
eng?i=001-193452 [https://perma.cc/8KXV-KFLG].
211. Pojatina, App. No. 18568/12, ¶ 8; Kosait - ypien , App. No. 69489/12, ¶ 44.
212. Pojatina, App. No. 18568/12, ¶ 91; Kosait - ypien , App. No. 69489/12, ¶ 112.
213. Kosait - ypien , App. No. 69489/12, ¶¶ 90–110.
214. Id. ¶ 107.
215. Tysi c v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, ¶ 116 (Mar. 20, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-79812 [https://perma.cc/EZ68-YCL9].
216. Ioni -Ciurez v. Romania, No. 42594/14 (Mar. 7, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-172633 [https://perma.cc/A7JQ-639T].
217. Id.
218. Id. § B.
219. Compare id. (“Under Romanian law home birth is neither expressly prohibited nor
allowed.”), with Ternovszky v. Hungary, App. No. 67545/09, ¶ 6 (Dec. 14, 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102254 [https://perma.cc/2JGU-GXHF] (“[T]here is no comprehensive
legislation on home birth in force in Hungary . . . .”).
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abandon attempts to reconcile it with more recent case law by finding
no Article 8 violation, or revisit the right to choice in childbirth
entirely. The following Subsection thus encourages the ECtHR to align
its home birth jurisprudence with its abortion jurisprudence—although
states may have some leeway in regulating home births, once they
permit home births, they should make them accessible to all pregnant
women.
2. Applying Human Rights Law Principles to Home Births. This
Subsection uses the core international human rights law principles to
map the various rights- and interests-holders in the home birth space,
advocating a framework for the ECtHR to use in its next home birth
decision. The analysis below assumes that a state both permits home
births and recognizes conscientious objection under its domestic law.
First, as with eugenic abortions, the core stakeholders are
pregnant women, fetuses, and medical care providers. Pregnant
women have the right to choose how to give birth, including the
location.220 Fetuses hold only interests, not Article 8 rights; in the home
birth context, fetuses are on the cusp of becoming children and thus
rightsholders, so one can identify a strong interest in—arguably
approaching a right to—a safe birth.221 Finally, medical care providers
can act as a proxy for fetal interests and also retain their conscientious
objection rights not to participate in procedures to which they are
morally opposed.222 The state may protect and represent the various
rights and interests, namely the health and safety of mothers and
newborns.223 Again, assuming that the relevant state permits both
home birth and conscientious objection under its domestic law, the
ECtHR should use the core human rights principles to determine the
margin within which the state may prescribe policies to regulate the
rights and interests conflicts under the ECHR.
As in the eugenic abortion context, the Strasbourg Court should
next consider what the state must and must not do, or its positive and
negative obligations. Under Principle I, once the state has decided to
allow women to choose to give birth at home under domestic law, its
negative obligations prescribe that it may not inhibit the safety of or

220.
221.
222.
223.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.D.
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access to home births through restrictions on medical care providers
attending them. Additionally, the state has a positive obligation to
ensure the availability of safe home birth options by ensuring that
private actors do not inhibit the exercise of the right to choice.224
According to Principle III, the state must not restrict home births on
the basis of alleged fetal rights. And as with abortion, states may permit
medical care providers to exercise conscientious objection and opt out
of attending and providing medical assistance at home births under
Principle II. In line with Principle I, however, the state must
simultaneously ensure permitting conscientious objection does not
eradicate the meaning of the right to home birth. A medical care
provider may be able to opt out, but this should not impair a pregnant
woman’s access to medical assistance at her home birth.
Subsequently, the ECtHR should consider what the state may do
within the bounds of both human rights law and its margin of
appreciation. Principle III does not prohibit the state from considering
the rights of children, including newborns, in formulating home birth
regulations. Further, Principles I and III permit the state to regulate
the conditions under which home births may be allowed to occur under
the supervision of a medical care provider, as long as the right to home
births is not rendered inaccessible.
Once again, these limitations on what is permissible leave a
significant space in which states may shape their own home birth
policies. Even when finding home birth regulations did not constitute
an Article 8 violation, the ECtHR itself acknowledged home births do
not pose significant safety concerns for women with low-risk
pregnancies.225 Fetal interests may warrant increasing protection as
birth—and thus the existence of a child, who is a rightsholder—
approaches. In line with representing fetal interests in and securing
children’s rights to safety in childbirth, pursuant to Principle III, the
state may set its own pregnancy risk threshold to identify women who
should give birth in a medical facility as opposed to at home. In order

224. See EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., supra note 32, at 8 (“[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is
essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities,
it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition . . . , there may
be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private life.”).
225. See Dubská & Krejzová v. Czech Republic, App. Nos. 28859/11, 28473/12, ¶ 96 (Dec. 11,
2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148632 [https://perma.cc/WC2P-BFPW] (noting in the
cases of low-risk pregnancies attended by midwives, “the majority of the research studies
presented to it do not suggest that there is an increased risk for home births compared to births
in a hospital”).
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to achieve this, the state might require all women who intend to give
birth at home to be regularly screened for certain higher risk factors
months or weeks prior to exercising their right to give birth at home.
For those pregnancies in which the pregnant woman’s or fetus’s health
appears to meet the risk threshold, the state may condition access to
medical attendance during birth on it occurring in a medical facility.
Similarly, in line with Principle III, the state may set standards of the
conditions in which home births attended by medical care providers
are permitted to occur. For example, the state may require the home
be within a certain geographic radius from a hospital in case of
emergency or certain sanitation standards must be met during the
weeks and days prior to the home birth. In doing so, states can
simultaneously pursue their legitimate aims of protecting health and
safety and operate within their margins of appreciation, all while
upholding a meaningful right to reproductive choice when it comes to
birth locations. As with abortions, it is certainly possible to balance the
relevant rights and interests without resorting to effective bans on
home births in violation of pregnant women’s human rights.
CONCLUSION
The ECtHR has thus far failed to acknowledge the inconsistencies
in its reproductive rights jurisprudence. For the right to reproductive
health to be meaningful, ensuring access to abortion services is
insufficient. The ECtHR must confirm abortion rights are not subject
to limitations based on women’s motivations, and it must apply the
same access standard to other reproductive rights, such as the right to
choice in determining how and where to give birth. By ensuring
equivalent protections for rights that are comparably vital to women’s
agency, the ECtHR will give effect to the full meaning of the right to
reproductive health. Through the international human rights law
framework proposed in this Note, the ECtHR has the tools it needs to
resolve these matters consistently and in accordance with globally
recognized standards.
In fact, the proposed reproductive rights framework may, and
should, be expanded via further research. In addition to applying to
abortion and home birth disputes, it may be effective in the contexts of
reproductive health issues like in vitro fertilization and gestational
surrogacy. A version of this framework may also be exported beyond
Europe. As countries across the world prepare to face similar questions
around reproductive decision-making, medical care providers’ rights,
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and fetal interests, consideration of the three core principles should
guide courts’ analyses and ensure compliance with human rights
standards.226
Ultimately, reproductive freedom remains a divisive issue in
various national contexts. At their core, many cultural wars embody
the struggle between religious interests and reproductive autonomy.
Purporting neither to advance a final resolution for such conflicts nor
to develop a rights hierarchy, this Note advocates for the centrality of
human rights law in balancing the various rights and interests at stake
in each given conflict. As a result, when the international human rights
landscape evolves to expand certain rights—even at the expense of
others—judicial decision-makers should take note and conform their
analytical frameworks to the direction of human rights norms.

226. For example, in November 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit lifted a
preliminary injunction on a Tennessee law that bans abortions motivated by fetal race, sex, or a
Down syndrome diagnosis. Order at 3, 5, Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery, No. 205969 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2020). In February 2021, South Dakota’s governor introduced a bill seeking
to ban abortions obtained on the basis of a fetal Down syndrome diagnosis. H.B. 1110, 2021 Leg.,
96th Sess. (S.D. 2021). It has since been signed into law. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-90 (2021).
In Mexico, a ruling decriminalizing abortion by the Supreme Court has been undermined in
practice by an expansive conscientious objection law. Natalie Kitroeff & Oscar Lopez, Abortion
Is No Longer a Crime in Mexico. But Will Doctors Object?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/09/13/world/americas/mexico-abortion-objectors.html?referringSource=
articleShare [https://perma.cc/HX58-KB9H]. Mexico’s Supreme Court is expected to take up the
conscientious objection issue in the coming weeks. Id.

